Web: http://arxiv.org/abs/2201.12489

June 23, 2022, 1:11 a.m. | Zhijian Duan, Jingwu Tang, Yutong Yin, Zhe Feng, Xiang Yan, Manzil Zaheer, Xiaotie Deng

cs.LG updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org

One of the central problems in auction design is developing an
incentive-compatible mechanism that maximizes the auctioneer's expected
revenue. While theoretical approaches have encountered bottlenecks in
multi-item auctions, recently, there has been much progress on finding the
optimal mechanism through deep learning. However, these works either focus on a
fixed set of bidders and items, or restrict the auction to be symmetric. In
this work, we overcome such limitations by factoring \emph{public} contextual
information of bidders and items into the …

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