Feb. 23, 2024, 5:43 a.m. | Yurong Chen, Zhaohua Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Zhiyi Huang

cs.LG updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org

arXiv:2402.14486v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: This paper considers the hidden-action model of the principal-agent problem, in which a principal incentivizes an agent to work on a project using a contract. We investigate whether contracts with bounded payments are learnable and approximately optimal. Our main results are two learning algorithms that can find a nearly optimal bounded contract using a polynomial number of queries, under two standard assumptions in the literature: a costlier action for the agent leads to a better …

abstract agent algorithms arxiv cs.ai cs.gt cs.lg econ.th hidden paper payments project type work

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