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Repeated Contracting with Multiple Non-Myopic Agents: Policy Regret and Limited Liability
Feb. 28, 2024, 5:42 a.m. | Natalie Collina, Varun Gupta, Aaron Roth
cs.LG updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org
Abstract: We study a repeated contracting setting in which a Principal adaptively chooses amongst $k$ Agents at each of $T$ rounds. The Agents are non-myopic, and so a mechanism for the Principal induces a $T$-round extensive form game amongst the Agents. We give several results aimed at understanding an under-explored aspect of contract theory -- the game induced when choosing an Agent to contract with. First, we show that this game admits a pure-strategy \emph{non-responsive} equilibrium …
abstract agents arxiv contracting cs.ds cs.gt cs.lg form game multiple policy results study type
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