all AI news
The Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Unknown Valuations
March 22, 2024, 4:43 a.m. | Nicol\`o Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi
cs.LG updates on arXiv.org arxiv.org
Abstract: We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item's value only if the auction is won. Our main contribution is a complete characterization, up to logarithmic factors, of the minimax regret in terms of the auction's \emph{transparency}, which controls the amount of information on competing bids disclosed by the auctioneer at the end of each auction. Our results hold under different …
abstract arxiv cs.ds cs.gt cs.lg minimax price role study transparency type valuations value
More from arxiv.org / cs.LG updates on arXiv.org
Jobs in AI, ML, Big Data
Data Architect
@ University of Texas at Austin | Austin, TX
Data ETL Engineer
@ University of Texas at Austin | Austin, TX
Lead GNSS Data Scientist
@ Lurra Systems | Melbourne
Senior Machine Learning Engineer (MLOps)
@ Promaton | Remote, Europe
Data Engineer - New Graduate
@ Applied Materials | Milan,ITA
Lead Machine Learning Scientist
@ Biogen | Cambridge, MA, United States